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I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence affects millions of women in the United States.'
Despite the availability of civil protective orders, one of the most serious
limitations on their effectiveness has been the pervasive lack of enforce-
ment by the police. The tragic consequences of this phenomenon are il-
lustrated in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,2 a case in which three
children were murdered by their father as a result of the police's failure
to enforce a protective order. Despite these consequences, the Supreme
Court found that the children's mother had no recourse.3 Ignoring the
plain language of the Colorado statute and extensive legislative history
indicating law enforcement's mandatory obligation to enforce civil pro-
tection orders, the Court held that the mother was not entitled to en-
forcement of the order. Castle Rock is thus the most recent example of
the courts' resistance to treat violence against women as a serious prob-
lem worthy of the attention and remedial powers of law enforcement offi-
cials. On a more fundamental level, Castle Rock is an example of the
courts' implicit sanctioning of male power and control. Part I of this note
details the underlying facts and the Court's analysis in Castle Rock. Part
II presents a brief history of domestic violence policy in America. Part
III introduces the feminist framework used to challenge the Court's deci-
sion. Part IV applies this framework to Castle Rock and argues that the
decision reinforces social dominance of men over women. Part V argues
that courts need to acknowledge the pervasiveness of domestic violence
and address this problem by tackling the deeply rooted underlying issue
of gender inequality.
1. See, e.g., Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Extent, Natures,
and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings from the National Violence
Against Women Survey, 2000 NAT'L INST. OF JUST. 20 available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf
files/njj/181867.pdf (stating that approximately 1.3 million women are physically assaulted
by an intimate partner in the United States each year); see also United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 629, 631 (1999) (citing Domestic Violence: Not Just a Family Matter: Hearing
on Domestic Violence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)) (estimating that up to three to four million women
are battered each year).
2. 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
3. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2802 (2005).
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II. TowN OF CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES
A. The Facts
In 1999, Jessica Gonzales and her estranged husband, Simon Gonzales,
were going through a divorce.4 According to Ms. Gonzales, Mr. Gonza-
les had been behaving erratically, breaking into the house numerous
times, and once attempting to hang himself in front of their three chil-
dren.5 Ms. Gonzales repeatedly contacted the police to notify them of
her husband's frightening behavior.6
In May of 1999, Ms. Gonzales obtained a temporary restraining order
against her husband.7 The order commanded her husband not to "molest
or disturb the peace" of Ms. Gonzales and their three daughters8 and to
"remain at least 100 yards from the family home at all times." 9 The order
warned that violators may be arrested without any notice and that law
enforcement officials "shall use every reasonable means to enforce [the]
restraining order.., when [they] have probable cause that the restrained
person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of [the] order
",10
At approximately five o'clock one evening, Mr. Gonzales abducted the
children while they were playing outside their family home. 1 Ms. Gon-
zales called the Castle Rock Police Department, which dispatched two
officers. 2 When the officers arrived, they told Ms. Gonzales "there was
nothing they could do" about the protective order, and suggested that
"[she] call the Police Department again if the . . . children did not return
... by 10:00 p.m."3
Around 8:30 p.m., Ms. Gonzales spoke to Mr. Gonzales on his mobile
telephone. 4 Mr. Gonzales indicated he had the children at a nearby
amusement park.15 Ms. Gonzales again called police, requesting that
4. Id. at 2800.
5. Gonzales vs. Castle Rock, CBS NEWS, Mar. 20, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/sto-
ries/2005/03/17/60minutes/main681416.shtml (recounting the traumatic attempted hanging,
where the three daughters had to contact the police while their mother held the rope away
from their father's neck).
6. Id.
7. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2800.
8. Id. at 2800-01.
9. Id. at 2801.
10. Id. at 2800-01.
11. Id. at 2801.
12. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2800.
13. Id. at 2801 (noting that the officers were unwilling to follow the temporary re-





they attempt to find and arrest Mr. Gonzales at the park. 6 The police
refused to perform any duties prescribed by the temporary restraining
order, and instead, insisted Ms. Gonzales wait for her husband to bring
the girls home.17
At approximately 10:10 p.m., Ms. Gonzales called the police to report
that the children were still missing.18 The dispatcher instructed Ms. Gon-
zales to continue waiting until midnight rather than obtain help from the
police. 9 At midnight she reported that the children remained missing.2"
When the dispatcher refused to help, Ms. Gonzales went to her husband's
apartment, and upon discovering he was not home, she called the po-
lice.21 After waiting at least forty minutes for the police to arrive, Ms.
Gonzales went to the police station and met with an officer who took an
incident report.22 But rather than attempt to enforce the protective order
or locate her three children, the officer went to dinner.23
Mr. Gonzales later arrived at the police station, opening fire on the
police with a semiautomatic handgun. Police returned fire and killed
him.24 Police then located the lifeless bodies of the children inside his
truck.25
B. The Supreme Court's Opinion
1. The Majority
The Supreme Court posed the issue "whether an individual who has
obtained a state-law restraining order has a constitutionally protected
property interest in having the police enforce the restraining order
.... "26 The Court began by noting that a person must have a legitimate
claim or "entitlement" to a benefit before the benefit can be enforced as
a property interest.27 According to the Court, entitlements are created
by "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
16. Id. at 2801-02.
17. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2801-02.








26. Id. at 2800 (2005) (considering that "[the police] have probable cause to believe
[the restraining order] has been violated").
27. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2803 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972)) (defining benefits as a mere unilateral expectation of a property
right).
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source, such as state law.",28 A benefit is not an entitlement, however, if
officials have discretion to grant or deny it.29
The Court first held that the Colorado statute, which provides that "a
peace officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining
order"3 did not create an entitlement due to the "well established tradi-
tion of police discretion [that] has long coexisted with apparently
mandatory arrest statutes."31 The Court pointed out that, "[f]or a num-
ber of reasons, including their legislative history, insufficient resources,
and [the] sheer physical impossibility [of enforcing every protective or-
der], it has been recognized that [these] statutes cannot be interpreted
literally.",3 2 Against this backdrop, the Court held that the Colorado stat-
ute needed "stronger" mandatory language if it were to be a "true man-
date[.]" 33 Even if the statute were interpreted to make enforcement
mandatory, the Court reasoned, Ms. Gonzales did not have an entitle-
ment to enforcement because the statute did not explicitly state that she
was a "protected person" specifically entitled to enforcement of re-
straining orders.34 The Court added that, even if the right were an enti-
tlement, it was not clear that an individual entitlement to enforcement of
a protective order could constitute a "property" interest, as "such a right
has no ascertainable monetary value."35 From this analysis, the Court
concluded that Ms. Gonzales did not have a property interest under the
Due Process Clause in enforcing the restraining order against Mr.
Gonzales.36
2. The Dissent
The dissenting opinion successfully identifies the flaws in the majority's
reasoning. Justice Stevens argued that while some states give law en-
forcement officials discretion to decide when enforcement of a protective
order is necessary, the legislative history of the Colorado statute and the
language of the statute on its face clearly indicate that Colorado intended
to limit police officer discretion when responding to domestic violence.
Justice Stevens noted:
28. Id. at 2803 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976)).
29. Id. at 2803 (citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)).
30. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3)(a) (2002).
31. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2805-06.
32. Id. at 2806 (quoting 1-4.5 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1-124 to -25
cmt. (2d ed. 1980)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2808-09 (distinguishing the power of a "protected person" to initiate crimi-
nal or civil contempt hearings and requesting that the violator be arrested).
35. Id. at 2809.
36. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2810.
2006]
THE SCHOLAR
In adopting this legislation, the Colorado General Assembly joined a
nationwide movement of States that took aim at the crisis of police
underenforcement in the domestic violence sphere by implementing
"mandatory arrest" statutes. The crisis of underenforcement had va-
rious causes, not least of which was the perception by police depart-
ments and police officers that domestic violence was a private,
"family" matter and that arrest was to be used as a last resort ....
[T]he purpose of these statutes was precisely to "counter police resis-
tance to arrests in domestic violence cases by removing or restricting
police officer discretion; mandatory arrest policies would increase
police response and reduce batterer recidivism. 3 7
In response to the majority's holding that Ms. Gonzales did not have an
entitlement to enforcement of the protective order because the statute
did not explicitly identify her as a "protected person," the dissent cor-
rectly pointed out that explicit identification is not necessary, as it is clear
that the Colorado statute was enacted precisely for the narrow class of
persons who are beneficiaries of protective orders.38 The dissent also un-
dermined the majority's concern that enforcement of a property right
must have "some ascertainable monetary value"39 by pointing out that
the Court has previously "made clear that the property interests pro-
tected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of
real estate, chattels, or money[,]" 4 and that "the types of interests pro-
tected as property are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating to
37. Id. at 2817 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the
State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 1657, 1669
(2004)); see also Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1107 (2004) rev'd sub
nom. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (quoting Hearing on
House Bill 1253 Before the H. Judicial Comm., 59th Cong. 3 (Colo. 1994)). Colorado's
legislative history indicated a clear intent to impose mandatory obligations on law enforce-
ment officials:
[T]he entire criminal justice system must act in a consistent manner, which does not
now occur. The police must make probable cause arrests. The prosecutors must pros-
ecute every case. Judges must apply appropriate sentences, and probation officers
must monitor their probationers closely. And the offender needs to be sentenced to
offender-specific therapy. So this means the entire system must send the same message
and enforce the same moral values, and that is abuse is wrong and violence is criminal.
And so we hope that House Bill 1253 starts us down this road." (emphasis omitted).
Id.
38. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2816 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing why the Court's
formalistic analysis fails).
39. Id. at 2809 (majority opinion).
40. Id. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972)) (describing how property can include intangibles).
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the whole domain of social and economic fact."4 1 Justice Stevens accord-
ingly concluded that the enforcement of a protective order is an entitle-
ment "no less concrete and no less valuable than other government
services" that have been given "property" status, such as education and
other entitlements that defy easy categorization.42
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY IN AMERICA
A. Early Tolerance of Domestic Violence
The practice of domestic violence in the United States originated from
English common law, which allowed a man to beat his wife with a rod no
thicker than the width of his thumb.43 Although domestic violence was
no longer overtly endorsed by the turn of the nineteenth century, courts
continued to hold that the government should not interfere with marital
relationships unless "serious" violence had occurred.44 In 1874, the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that "[i]f no permanent injury has
been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor dangerous violence shown by the
husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and
leave the parties to forget and forgive."45 Until the 1970s, the response
from the legal system at large was still one in which "women's complaints
of abuse were [effectively] trivialized and ridiculed, women's injuries
were ignored, women's terror and fear were invalidated, and women
were blamed by the police and the courts for the violence they suf-
fered."46 During that period, courts were reluctant to grant women in-
volved in abusive relationships legal remedies.47 For example, a woman
could file for limited injunctive relief in some jurisdictions, but only if
41. Id. (quoting Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982)) (internal
quotations omitted).
42. Id. at 2822-23 (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), in which the Supreme
Court held that there is a property interest in receiving due process in the procedures
surrounding the revocation of a driver's license while an accident claim is pending
adjudication).
43. See Marion Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic Vio-
lence, But Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 533, 535-36 (1996) (describing the source of
domestic violence in the United States and the notorious "rule of thumb").
44. Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking
the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 10
(1999).
45. Id. (quoting State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874)).
46. JAMES PTACEK, BATYERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDI-
CIAL RESPONSES 47-48 (1999).
47. Id. at 47 (discussing that it was not until the mid 1970s that courts began holding
police departments liable for failing in their duties when an arrest was warranted).
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they were divorced or separated from their partners, and no criminal pen-
alty for an injunction violation existed.4 8
B. Civil Protective Orders
Beginning in the 1960s, battered women's advocates began to direct
public attention to the issue of domestic violence. These advocates of-
fered services to domestic violence victims independent of state involve-
ment, providing the first shelters for battered women fleeing their
abusers.49 Although many battered women's advocates did not seek re-
course within the government because they regarded the state as the ulti-
mate "enforcer of a patriarchal system,"' others acknowledged that their
efforts to protect battered women would be severely limited in the ab-
sence of state involvement. 51 Starting in the mid-1970s, advocates for
state involvement successfully fought for legislation providing easier ac-
cess to civil protection orders. 52 Unlike typical criminal and civil court-
decreed orders of protection, domestic violence civil protection orders
provide more comprehensive options for relief.53 These orders can in-
clude provisions for child custody arrangements, provisions requiring an
abuser to terminate all contact with the victim,54 and even provisions re-
quiring a person to seek counseling55 or drug and alcohol treatment.5 6
The vast majority of legislation also provides for emergency ex parte re-
lief, which gives court-ordered protection for the victim immediately
upon issuance of the order up through the time the case actually goes to
48. Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Do-
mestic Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1657, 1665 (2004) (explaining that in conjunction
with police department apathy, the courts could do little to provide assistance to battered
women because no civil remedy was available).
49. Id. at 1666 (indicating that women who began the safe houses had often overcome
abusive relationships themselves).
50. Id. (speculating that states' support of male dominance in the courtroom made it
unlikely to establish state-provided shelter to those domestically abused).
51. Id. at 1665 ("[M]any battered women's advocates realized the need to effect sys-
tematic change, and focused not only on assistance to individual women, but also on re-
vamping the laws and policies that ignored domestic violence as an issue for the public
justice system.") (emphasis added).
52. PrACEK, supra note 46, at 48 (indicating that attempts at change were successful
because of a domestic violence restraining order and other new civil and criminal remedies
at the state and federal level).
5.jdi'A . IM 1,53. Judith A amith, Battered Nlon-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A
Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 95, 100 (2005).
54. Id. at 100 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-102 (2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5
(Michie 2003)).
55. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (2003)).
56. See id. at 95, 100 (explaining the difference between civil protection orders, crimi-
nal orders of protection, and the relief each may provide).
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trial.57 Studies show that properly enforced protective orders reduce vio-
lence against victims, providing them with the protection needed to help
them regain their emotional well-being, a sense of security, and overall
control over their lives.58 By the 1990s, every state had enacted a civil
protection order statute. 5
9
C. Mandatory Arrest Statutes
Despite the availability of protective orders, one of the most serious
limitations on their effectiveness has been the widespread lack of en-
forcement by the police. As Castle Rock6" exemplifies, police indiffer-
ence can lead to tragic consequences. Women like Ms. Gonzales
regularly encounter law enforcement officers who discount domestic vio-
lence as "non-serious, non-criminal, or as a private matter best settled
within the home."61 Police often respond to domestic violence calls ei-
ther by taking no action, by purposefully delaying response in the hope of
avoiding confrontation, or, when they do respond, by attempting to medi-
ate the situation or allowing the parties time to collect themselves. 62
Data collected by several agencies suggest that police seldom make ar-
rests in cases of domestic violence to which they actually respond.63
Other anecdotal evidence suggests that officers would blame the wives
for being victims of domestic violence or make comments implying that
57. Epstein, supra note 44, at 11 (citing Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Ofloff, Provid-
ing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 901, 1031-43 (1993)) (indicating that all jurisdictions authorize some
form of emergency ex parte relief upon filing a complaint for civil protection).
58. Smith, supra note 53, at 95; Jeremy Travis, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Protection
Orders: Victims' Views on Effectiveness, 1998 NAT'L INST. OF JUST. RES. PREVIEW 1 (distin-
guishing instances where the abusers had previously acted violently and where the protec-
tive order likely did not prevent future attacks).
59. Sack, supra note 48, at 1667; Smith, supra note 53, at 100; OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OVC BULL. No. 4, ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE OR-
DERS (2002) (providing an overview of current protective order statutes).
60. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2816 (2005).
61. James Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women ... Still: Unfulfilled Promises of
Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1149, 1189
(1994-1995).
62. Machaela M. Hoctor, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need
for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CAL. L. REV. 643, 649 (1997).
63. Sarah Mausolff Buel, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, 11 HARV. WO-
MEN'S L.J, 213, 217 (1988) (citing various studies on arrest rates by police, reporting rates
as low as three to fourteen percent in situations where they observed an injured victim);
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence, 2000
NAT'L VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURV. 49 (finding that domestic violence calls resulted
in arrests 34.6% of the time for victims of a physical assault).
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they deserve to be beaten by their husbands.64 Such archaic misconcep-
tions and stereotypes have contributed to law enforcement's failure to
arrest men who abuse their partners or violate protective orders.65
By the early 1990s, over a dozen jurisdictions enacted "mandatory ar-
rest" statutes that restricted police discretion in domestic violence situa-
tions.6 6 These statutes generally provide that the following circumstances
are grounds for mandatory arrest by the officer, based on probable cause:
(1) when violence previously occurred or is likely to occur in the future;
(2) when terms of the protective order are violated; (3) when terms of a
protective order are violated in the presence of a police officer; (4) when
there is an aggravated battery; and (5) when an officer witnesses a physi-
cal injury on a party.67 In 1984, the Attorney General's "Task Force on
Family Violence" publicly acknowledged the failure of police to arrest
perpetrators of crimes of domestic violence as one of the most formidable
obstacles to addressing the epidemic of domestic violence in the United
States.6 8 Citing several well-known studies documenting the effective-
ness of mandatory arrest in domestic violence cases,69 the Attorney Gen-
eral issued a report recommending arrest as the "preferred response" in
domestic violence cases. 70 Subsequent congressional hearings made simi-
64. Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitu-
tion Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 798 n.46 (1986) (providing
examples of police officers endorsing violence against women by their intimate partners);
see also Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 50 (1992) (discussing police response to domestic violence
calls).
65. Zorza, supra note 64, at 48-49.
66. Sack, supra note 48, at 1670.
67. Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of
Race and Gender in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 171, 180 n.44
(1994).
68. See Sack, supra note 48, at 1669 n.61 (analyzing the developments in domestic
violence policy and its effect on future domestic violence policy); see also ATrORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT [hereinafter TASK FORCE ON
FAMILY VIOLENCE] 16-18 (1984) for Attorney General's report on the effectiveness of
police officers' arrest of domestic violence offenders.
69. See generally Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State's Response
to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1843, 1854 (2001) (citing ATFORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY ViOi ENCE: FINAL REPORT 17 (1984)) (describing the
most publicized study, the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, which was con-
ducted in 1984 by researchers Lawrence Sherman and Richard Berk). The study reported
that arrest significantly reduced the risk of re-offense over a six month period, as compared
with alternative police responses of either ordering one party out of the residence or advis-
ing the couple on how to solve their problems at the scene. Id.
70. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 68, at 22.
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lar recommendations and presented a plethora of evidence on law en-
forcement's longstanding practice of treating domestic violence less
seriously than similarly violent crimes among strangers.71 Indeed, the
Colorado statute sought to address these very issues.72 Today, Colorado
is one of twenty-one states and the District of Columbia that have imple-
mented statutes mandating arrest in domestic violence situations. 73
Despite studies documenting the effectiveness of mandatory arrest pol-
icies in curtailing domestic violence, 4 there has been much resistance to
meaningful implementation.75 Opponents argue that mandatory arrest
statutes are too inflexible, requiring arrest when the facts are disputed,
and preventing police from exercising discretion in order to maximize
limited resources. 76 Courts dismiss the extensive legislative history docu-
menting the seriousness and pervasiveness of domestic violence as issues
of "privacy, 77 and "property" thereby failing to provide adequate re-
course to victims. Without getting into an involved debate about the va-
lidity of mandatory arrest statutes as a means of addressing the problem
of domestic violence, 78 it is clear that-even with mandatory arrest stat-
71. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41-42 (1993) (discussing possible amendments to
the Violence Against Women Act which reflect a "national consensus" intolerant of those
who engage in domestic violence).
72. Brief of National Coalition Against Domestic Violence & National Center for
Victims of Crime as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4, Town of Castle Rock of
Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-278).
73. Sack, supra note 48, at 1670 (citing NEAL MILLER, INST. OF LAW & JUSTICE, Do-
MESTIC VIOLENCE: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION DEFINING POLICE AND PROSECU-
TION DUTIES AND POWERS 28 n.86 (2004), available at http://ilj.org/publications/DV-
Legislation-3.pdf (listing mandatory arrest statutes)).
74. See Epstein, supra note 69, at 1853-54.
75. See, e.g., Wanless, supra note 43, at 544 (indicating that sixty percent of Ohioans
were against mandatory arrest in domestic violence situations).
76. Id. (arguing police must continue to use discretion to determine probable cause
exists that a crime was committed, removing the decision of whether or not to arrest after
the determination of whether domestic violence had occurred).
77. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613-15 (2000) (holding Congress had no
authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit gender-motivated crimes of violence
under the Violence Against Women Act because the crimes were not "economic in nature"
and because they were "truly local" rather than national in scope; ignoring the extensive
Congressional record pointing to the economic effects of domestic violence and the failure
of states to address the clearly pervasive problem of domestic violence); see also ELIZA-
BETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 89 (Yale University
2000) (arguing that the use of "privacy" rhetoric to justify nonintervention devalues wo-
men and communicates to the wider public that women's issues are so invaluable they do
not warrant equal protection of the law).
78. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 77, at 186 (criticizing mandatory arrests because they:
(1) are "paternalistic and essentialize women's experiences" presupposing that mandatory
arrests are the best approach for all women; (2) subject abused women to what amounts to
"coercion at the hands of the state" and re-victimize the woman; (3) cause the perpetrator
2006]
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utes-a protection order remains "just a piece of paper," a token display
of concern79 for the millions of women who are battered each year in the
United States.
D. Civil Challenges to Police Conduct
The 1970s and 1980s saw a handful of successful civil challenges to po-
lice conduct. In Bruno v. Codd,8 ° twelve domestic violence victims
brought an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against
the New York City Police Department, alleging a pattern of discrimina-
tion and noncompliance with controlling statutes and regulations.81 The
court acknowledged that the failure of the officers to respond to requests
for help reflected police reluctance to intervene in what they character-
ized as "domestic disputes" instead of criminal offenses. 82 The court also
acknowledged that, because forty percent of police night calls in New
York City at that time involved such cases, the lack of police response
made protective orders issued by courts largely ineffective.83 As a result,
the New York City Police Department agreed to change its policies to
improve domestic violence call response times and arrest rates.84
to retaliate by inflicting further abuse on the victim; (4) strip women of their autonomy;
and (5) depict them as eternally weak or always victims by removing control).
79. PTACEK, supra note 46, at 169-170 (demonstrating some batterers are "incorrigi-
ble" and no piece of paper will prevent their violent actions).
80. 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979).
81. Bruno v. Codd, 393 N.E.2d 976, 977 (N.Y. 1979). The court noted:
In a nutshell, the gravamen of their complaint is that probation and Family Court
nonjudicial personnel, with the knowledge and either the tacit consent or express ap-
proval of their supervisors, engage in a pattern of conduct calculated (1) to deter bat-
tered wives from filing petitions for orders of protection against their offending
husbands, (2) to block them from meaningful access to Family Court Judges empow-
ered to issue temporary orders of protection, and (3) by failing to advise the wives that
the defendants proffer of counseling is voluntary, to dissuade complainants from pur-
suing their legal remedies. Id.
82. Id. at 980.
83. Id. (quoting Wife Beating: The Hidden Offense, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 29, 1976, at 1).
84. Id. The quote noted:
By its terms the police have agreed hereafter to respond swiftly to every request for
protection and, as in an ordinary criminal case, to arrest the husband whenever there
is reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been committed against the wife or
that an order of protection or temporary order of protection has been violated. More-
over, officers are to remain at the scene of the alleged crime or violation in order to
terminate or prevent the commission of further offenses and to provide the wife with
other assistance. To assure that these undertakings are fulfilled, supervisory police
officers are to make all necessary revisions in their disciplinary and other regulations.
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A few years later, in Thurman v. City of Torrington,85 a federal court
held that the longstanding police practice in Connecticut of providing less
protection to women in abusive relationships than to people abused by
strangers violated the Equal Protection Clause.86 In Thurman, the police
failed to arrest the plaintiff's husband on several occasions, even after he
violated his probation conditions and a protective order.87 When one of-
ficer finally responded, the plaintiff's husband had already severely in-
jured her.88 Around the same time, in Sorichetti v. City of New York,8 9 a
mother brought a negligence action against the city to recover damages
for injuries inflicted on her child after police failed to respond to her re-
quest for enforcement of a protective order.9" The court reasoned that,
based on the history between the police and the mother, the police had a
sufficient "special relationship" with the mother and child to establish a
duty on the part of the police, which in turn supported the mother's negli-
gence claim.91 Holding in favor of the mother's claim, the court based its
decision on several factors: (1) police knowledge of the father's violent
history; (2) police knowledge of the threats the father made against the
mother and child; (3) the mother's previous pleas for assistance; and (4)
the police's failure to respond, even though the police assured the mother
that they would act.9 2 The court felt those factors created a "special rela-
tionship" between the police and the mother and child, which was suffi-
cient to establish negligence.93
85. 595 F. Supp 1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984).
86. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984). The
court noted:
City officials and police officers are under an affirmative duty to preserve law and
order, and to protect the personal safety of persons in the community. This duty ap-
plies equally to women whose personal safety is threatened by individuals with whom
they have or have had a domestic relationship .... If officials have notice of the
possibility of attacks ... they are under an affirmative duty to take reasonable mea-
sures to protect the personal safety of such persons in the community. Failure to per-
form this duty would constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws (citation
omitted). Id.
87. Id. at 1524 ("[A]lthough informed of the violation of the conditional discharge,
[the police] made no attempt to ascertain [husband's] whereabouts or to arrest him.").
88. Id. at 1524-26 (documenting victim received multiple stabbings to the chest, neck
and throat before the police arrived at the scene 25 minutes later).
89. 482 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1985).
90. Sorichetti v. City of N.Y., 482 N.E.2d 70, 72-73 (N.Y. 1985).
91. Id. at 74 (holding that the City of New York breached a special duty of care to the
mother, which extended to the child).
92. Id. at 74-75 (reasoning that a city only owes a duty to provide adequate police
protection when such a "special relationship" exists between the parties).
93. Id. at 75.
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Unfortunately, these successes have become the exception rather than
the rule. A few years after Sorchietti, the Supreme Court decided
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,94 where
the mother of a four-year-old child who had been severely beaten by his
father sued social workers and local officials who knew that the child was
being abused but did not remove him from his father's custody. 95 The
child was beaten so severely that he fell into a coma.96 Emergency brain
surgery revealed that the child suffered a series of hemorrhages from re-
peated head injuries over a long period of time.97 The child suffered
brain damage so severe that doctors predicted he would spend the rest of
his life confined to an institution.98
In an opinion described by Justice Blackmun as "a sad commentary
upon American life and constitutional principles," 99 the Supreme Court
held that state and local government agencies had no constitutional duty
to protect its citizens from private violence100 or other mishaps not attrib-
utable to the conduct of its employees.' 1 This case regrettably set the
tone for the Supreme Court's decision in Castle Rock.' °2
IV. THE "DOMINANCE" FRAMEWORK
A. Introduction to the Feminist Movement
Although social failure to respond to problems of battered women
has been justified on the grounds of privacy, this failure to respond is
an affirmative political decision that has serious public consequences
.... The state actively permits [domestic] violence by protecting the
94. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
95. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 192-93 (1989)
(finding that the Department of Social Services "suspected child abuse" based on the
child's numerous hospital visits but failed to take any action beyond "dutifully record[ing]
the[ ] incidents in her files").
96. Id. at 193.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Poor Joshua! ... abandoned by [the De-
partment of Social Services] who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who knew or
learned what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing except... 'dutifully record[]
these incidents in their files ....').
100. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-97 (majority opinion) (ignoring the facts which estab-
lish the state's active part in the life of the child and creating a special relationship with
that child to protect him from the danger into which the state placed him).
101. See id.
102. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
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privileges and prerogatives of the batterer .. . .These failures to
respond ... are part of "public patterns of conduct and morals."1 3
[Domestic] violence is part of a larger system of coercive control and
subordination; this system is based on structural gender inequality
and has political root .... In the context of [domestic] violence, the
impulse behind feminist legal arguments [is] to redefine the relation-
ship between the personal and the political, to definitively link vio-
lence and gender.10 4
During the "battered women's movement" in the 1960s, feminist activ-
ists challenged socially accepted notions of gender roles within the family
and in the workplace. 0 5 Feminists argued that domestic violence not
only threatened a woman's right not to be physically harmed, but also
undermined a woman's right to liberty, autonomy, and equality.10 6 They
viewed domestic violence as part of a larger system of control and subor-
dination, stemming from structural gender inequality.'07 This feminist
movement succeeded in shifting domestic violence from a private prob-
lem to an important public issue.'0 8 But while the law no longer expressly
grants men the right to abuse their partners, law enforcement proto-
cols10 9 and high court decisions like Castle Rock' continue to implicitly
condone domestic violence by effectively allowing the violence to con-
tinue. 1 As a result, domestic violence remains a major cause of injury
to women in the United States." 2 Feminists argue that in order to suc-
103. SCHNEIDER, supra note 77, at 92 (alteration in original) (quoting Martha Minow,
Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43
VAND. L. Rav. 1665, 1671-72 (1990)).
104. Id. at 5-6 (alterations in original).
105. Id. at 5.
106. SCHNEIDER, supra note 77, at 4.
107. SCHNEIDER, supra note 77, at 4-5.
108. Id. at 5-6 (explaining classification of domestic violence as a "private problem"
through the male dominated perspective).
109. Eppler, supra note 64, at 798 n.46; see also Zorza, supra note 64, at 46, 50.
110. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2816 (2005).
111. See id.; Eppler, supra note 64, at 798 n.46; see also Zorza, supra note 64, at 46, 50.
112. See generally Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Extent,
Natures, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings from the National Vio-
lence Against Women Survey, 2000 NAT'L INST. OF JUST. 10 available at http://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles/njj/181867.pdf (presenting statistical finds from the National Violence Against
Women Survey totaling the number of physically assaulted women at over one million).
See also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 629, 631 (1999) (citing Domestic Violence:
Not Just a Family Matter: Hearing on Domestic Violence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)) (speculating that
between three and four million women are victims of domestic violence each year).
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cessfully address the problem of domestic violence, courts must recognize
the deeply-rooted underlying social issue of gender inequality.
113
B. MacKinnon and "Dominance Feminism"
Catharine MacKinnon addresses this underlying issue of gender ine-
quality by demonstrating how the legal system fundamentally opposes
women's interests through a structure that perpetuates male domi-
nance. 14 MacKinnon argues that, in a male-dominated society such as
the United States, the law, which purports to be "objective," is actually
constructed to benefit the male perspective.1 15 She uses this notion as a
basis for the argument that the legal system effectively reinforces social
dominance of men over women.
1 1 6
MacKinnon likens objectivity to "point-of-viewlessness," 117 where no
particular point of view is expressed. She argues that what passes as ob-
jective analysis or point-of-viewlessness actually reflects the perspective
of the dominant group, which is concealed from society's view because
the dominant group possesses the power to have its version of reality
accepted as the "objective" view, or the truth:"
Men's physiology defines most sports, their needs define auto and
health insurance coverage, their socially designed biographies design
workplace expectations and successful career patterns, their perspec-
tives and concerns define quality in scholarship, their experiences
and obsessions define merit, their objectification of life defines art,
...their presence defines family, their inability to get along with
each other-their wars and rulerships-define history, [and] their
image defines god [sic] .... 119
113. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 257 (Aspen
Publishers 2d ed. 2003) ("[W]omen's self assertion through jobs or school particularly infu-
riates some [abusive] men.") (alterations in original) (quoting SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN
AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVE-
MENT 220 (1982)).
114. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 237
(1989) (suggesting that the invisibility of male dominance perpetuates a male point of view
on society through the laws).
115. See id. at 162 (analyzing objectivity as a masculine, socially created concept).
116. Id. at 237.
117. Id. at 162.
118. Id. at 237 ("Liberal legalism is thus a medium for male dominance both invisible
and legitimate by adopting the male point of view in law at the same time as it enforces
that view on society.").
119. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES OF LIFE AND
LAW 36 (1987) (internal footnotes omitted).
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Concealed is the substantive way in which man has become the mea-
sure of all things. Under the sameness standard, women are mea-
sured according to our correspondence with man, our equality
judged by our proximity to his measure. Under the difference stan-
dard, we are measured according to our lack of correspondence with
him, our womanhood judged by our distance from his measure.
Gender neutrality is thus simply the male standard .... Think about
it like those anatomy models in medical school. A male body is the
human body; all those extra things women have are studied in ob/
gyn. 1 0
Feminists have pointed out that the definition of domestic violence
used by courts tends to be "incident-focused, looking to the types of as-
saultive or coercive incidents and the number of times these occurred. 1 2 1
Feminists adopting MacKinnon's theory argue that such an approach, al-
though seemingly objective and gender-neutral, is actually an application
of the male standard or an incorporation of a subjective male version of
reality.' 22 Focusing on the incident ignores the victim's experience of the
violence as well as the power dynamics involved in an abusive relation-
ship.123 MacKinnon argues that a better approach to domestic violence
instead emphasizes the victim's behavioral and emotional responses in
addition to the batterer's point of view and motivation. This type of ap-
proach acknowledges the ongoing nature of an abusive relationship and
considers such things as whether the victim "modified her behavior or
intentionally maintained a particular consciousness or behavioral reper-
toire" in order to avoid being battered. 24 This conceptualization not
only considers the perspective and experiences of the "other" gender, but
also acknowledges the underlying issue of dominance and subordination,
thereby serving as a starting point from which one can address the issue
of domestic violence. 25 By embracing the status quo "objective" defini-
tion of domestic violence, society remains bound by the resulting legal
consequences (or lack thereof). A continuation of "the standard" uncriti-
cally takes for granted the arrangements made by a male-dominated soci-
ety without acknowledging the context of power and control in which
battering takes place.'26
120. Id. at 34.
121. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28 (1991-1992).
122. MAcKINNON, supra note 119, at 43.
123. Mahoney, supra note 121, at 28, 33.
124. Id. at 33 (internal quotations omitted).
125. MAcKINNON, supra note 119, at 43.
126. Id. at 42-43.
20061
THE SCHOLAR
MacKinnon goes on to point out that social power over women is pre-
sent in laws that profess to protect women through purportedly gender-
neutral rhetoric about liberty, equality, and citizen's rights.' 27 For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court has held-to the detriment of battered women-
that government intervention in marital relationships is unconstitutional
because the government should not interfere with private familial social
arrangements, and that they should respect citizens' right to privacy.128
MacKinnon would argue that, instead of masking the existence of gender
equality with such constitutional rhetoric, courts should focus on whether
the law perpetuates the subordination of women.129 This approach di-
rectly confronts the issue of women's inferior status, instead of using
men's needs and experiences as the standard by which to judge the treat-
ment of women.1
30
V. CASTLE ROCK: A Case Study
Analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Morrison13 1
where the Court struck down a portion of the Violence Against Women
Act,13 2 MacKinnon describes how the Court used "ostensibly gender-
neutral tools to achieve a substantive victory for the socially unequal in-
stitution of male dominance., 133 It can be argued that the Court used the
same reasoning in Castle Rock.1 34 On a superficial level, Castle Rock sig-
nifies the Court's reluctance to expand the definition of "property" to
incorporate the mandatory enforcement of civil protection orders.135 In
reality, however, and considering the Supreme Court's previous use of
notions like "privacy" to deny recourse for victims of domestic violence,
an application of MacKinnon's dominance framework reveals that Castle
Rock is not an "abstract application of neutral institutional priori-
127. MAcKINNON, supra note 114, at 42 (arguing that these purported gender neutral
laws only facilitate the domination).
128. See id. at 164-65. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
129. MAcKINNON, supra note 114, at 164 (discussing that when the government par-
ticipates in "negative freedom," refusing to alter the status quo, the group who receives the
"positive freedom" will control a second group and no amount of "negative freedom" will
protect the suppressed second group).
130. Id. at 242.
131. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
132. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (holding Congress exceeded
the power granted in the Commerce Clause to create the Violence Against Women Act
because the activity it sought to regulate was not economic activity).
133. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 207 (2005).
134. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2809 (2005) (holding
that in addition to the restraining order not being an entitlement, it is also not an interest in
property).
135. Id. at 2816.
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ties[.]"' 3 6 Rather, it is a refusal to recognize domestic violence as a seri-
ous issue that both grows out of and reinforces a pervasive pattern of
male dominance.
A. The Court's "Objective" Analysis
Feminists like MacKinnon have challenged the law's "objective" pro-
cess of selecting what should count as "fact," choosing what principles to
apply, and employing these principles to reach logically sound deci-
sions.13 7 This "legal method" has "[t]raditionally .. .operated within a
highly structured framework which offers little opportunity for funda-
mental questioning about the process of defining the issues, selecting rele-
vant principles, and excluding irrelevant ideas." '138 For example, courts
have traditionally analyzed cases according to patterns of questions estab-
lished in the past (e.g., is there a property right?), and in a context in
which consistency of ideas may be valued more highly than the identifica-
tion of new issues and perspectives, such as those of women in domestic
violence cases.139 This structure of the legal inquiry and its claim to neu-
trality and objectivity governed the way the Court in Castle Rock ana-
lyzed the case and significantly affected the outcome in favor of
upholding the institution of male dominance.
1. The Substantive Analysis
The Court's substantive analysis centers on the supposedly gender-neu-
tral notion of "property." At first glance, analyzing a case according to
whether the asserted right fits under the fundamental guarantees of "life,
liberty, and property" seems "objective." Accordingly, the determination
of whether an interest involves life, liberty or property determines
whether a person has a right to have his or her interest enforced. The
Court in Castle Rock found that, because the statutory language was not
"mandatory enough," Ms. Gonzales was not entitled to a property inter-
est of enforcement of the order and that, even if there were an entitle-
136. MACKINNON, supra note 133.
137. See, e.g., Mary Jane Mossman, Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference It
Makes, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 147, 148-49 (1987).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 154 (manipulating accepted ideas about the differences between men and
women to support the Court's desire to prevent a woman from practicing law in the British
Commonwealth).
That the court [in Mabel French's case in 1905] apparently did not question the appro-
priateness of applying a precedent from an earlier generation [thirty years earlier],
and from a foreign jurisdiction, seems remarkable. The possibility of distinguishing
the earlier decision is clear and the court's acceptance of the Bradwell decision as both
relevant and apparently binding is initially perplexing. Id.
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ment, such a right would not be a property interest, as the right has no
"monetary value."14 By applying these seemingly objective notions of
property and entitlement to the analysis, the Court's decision seems
justified.
Nevertheless, MacKinnon would argue that what seems like objective
analysis is actually the subjective viewpoint of the dominant group, be-
cause it dismisses women's interests offhand.141 The Court's systematic
property-based analysis ignores the arguments advanced by Ms. Gonzales
and organizations such as the National Coalition Against Domestic Vio-
lence and the National Network to End Domestic Violence. 42 The court
makes no mention of the domestic violence issues clearly implicated by
the facts of the case. It gives no thought to the fact that women have the
constitutional right to have their injuries addressed through effective and
equal enforcement of the laws against the actors that injure them. There-
fore, the Court's decision lies "less with the imperatives of institutional
forces [such as property and conserving resources] than with the gender
relations that impel those forces."' 4 3 The decision establishes and rein-
forces a historical "male tradition" of discounting domestic violence as
"simple trespass," "hurt feelings," '144 or something to address privately.
This is not to say that the Court came to the wrong conclusion in its prop-
erty analysis, but, as stated by MacKinnon:
It is to observe that no doctrine... requires that women's interest in
living as equals free from gender-based violence be judicially ac-
corded... priority .... Nothing in the design of the system exposes
the gender bias built into the history and tradition of the Constitu-
tion's structure and doctrines. Nothing requires that women's inter-
ests as such be given any consideration at all.14 5
Instead of limiting its substantive analysis to the "objective" question
of whether Ms. Gonzales meets the requirements to give her a protected
property interest, the Court should have considered the context that gave
rise to the facts and, therefore, the perspectives of the women in-
140. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2809.
141. See MAcKINNON, supra note 114, at 162.
142. Brief of National Coalition Against Domestic Violence & National Center for
Victims of Crime as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-278); Brief of National Network
to End Domestic Violence et al., Supporting Respondent, Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-278).
143. MAcKINNON, supra note 133, at 235.
144. CHAMALLAS, supra note 113, at 258.
145. MAcKINNON, supra note 133, at 236.
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volved.'4 6 If the Court had acknowledged that women have been subject
to "law [that] gives the husband power to use such a degree of force as is
necessary to make the wife behave herself and know her place," '14 7 and
recognized misconceptions and stereotypes about a woman's role in vio-
lent relationships (e.g., that she provoked the assault and therefore de-
served it), it would have realized that women have long experienced
inequalities on the ground of gender. Furthermore, the Court did not
give any weight to the statute's legislative history, 4 8 or to the countless
studies documenting the ineffectiveness of protective orders as a result of
the lack of enforcement to the detriment of victims of domestic vio-
lence. 4 9 Had the Court seriously considered these elements, it might
have concluded that law enforcement practices perpetuate these inequali-
ties. 150 Serious examination of the purpose behind the mandatory arrest
statute shows that the statute was established precisely to remedy the lack
of enforcement. 15 ' Put simply, had the Court looked past its "objective"
analysis, it would have understood the severity of domestic violence and
the underlying existence of gender inequality, where battering is a means
for men to control the women they abuse.' 52 Only then might the Court
begin to formulate a decision that considers all relevant perspectives and
gives due recourse for victims of domestic violence. 
153
146. CHAMALLAS, supra note 113, at 258 (suggesting an emphasis on motivation and
strategies of the batterer, shifting the focus from the how and why questions surrounding
the battery).
147. Joyner v. Joyner, 6 Jones Eq. 322, 325 (1862) (indicating that the mindset of the
extant generation of appropriate use of force include the use of a "horse-whip" on occasion
and switches to the extent they left bruises on the "weaker sex").
148. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41-42 (1993).
149. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Vio-
lence, 2000 NAT'L VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURV. 49 (reporting a very low rate of
arrest for physical assault victims).
150. SCHNEIDER, supra note 77, at 89 ("By declining to punish a man for inflicting
injuries on his wife.. . the law implies she is his property and he is free to control her as he
sees fit.").
151. Hoctor, supra note 62 (suggesting that mandatory arrest statutes intend to pro-
tect women by limiting police discretion to arrest the batterer, primarily in reaction to a
low arrest rate prior to legislation for domestic violence calls); see Epstein, supra note 69,
at 1854 (citing ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT 17
(1984)) (stating that the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment reported that high
likelihood arrest will prevent future violent episodes over the next six months).
152. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 77, at 5 (discussing how battery is a way men attempt
to control women, which is only amplified when the law is on the man's side).




The Court's decision to frame Castle Rock as a property issue 154 in-
stead of an issue of equality or women's rights, also serves as an example
of how courts use "ostensibly gender-neutral" frameworks to achieve "a
substantive victory for the socially unequal institution of male domi-
nance." 155 The structure of a court's "legal inquiry" can have a signifi-
cant effect on the outcome of a case. Courts have great discretion in
deciding how to approach a given set of facts, but often a desire to appeal
to "neutral" or "objective" legal concepts like "property" or "privacy"
exists.156 Accordingly, courts may determine what is "relevant" by sepa-
rating the "legal" issue from "political" or "moral" issues.157 The result is
that courts-like the Supreme Court in Castle Rock-often decide cases
in a way that ignores the broader social and political issues like those of
domestic violence and gender inequality. 158
Castle Rock is a prime example of this phenomenon. The Supreme
Court successfully disregards the political and social significance of the
case by construing the legal issue as simply one of property.159 While the
Court engages in an involved discussion about property, entitlement, and
discretion, it makes no reference to the extensive Colorado legislative his-
tory or reports documenting the pervasiveness and seriousness of domes-
tic violence, and the ineffective enforcement of civil protection orders. 6 °
Questions which are inside the defined boundaries-those that relate to
the notion of property 161-can be addressed by the Court, but issues
outside the boundaries-those relating to battered women's experiences
with their perpetrators and with law enforcement officials-are, by the
Court's definition, not relevant. For example, the Court refers to legisla-
tive history regarding interpretations of similar statutes to determine
whether the Colorado statute creates a mandatory obligation (and there-
fore an entitlement and property interest),162 but stops short of address-
ing any legislative history addressing the seriousness of domestic violence
154. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2809 (2005).
155. MAcKINNON, supra note 119, at 43.
156. Mossman, supra note 137, at 157 (arguing that the court's neutrality oftentimes
"both masks and legitimizes their personal views").
157. Id.
158. See id. (contrasting the court's intentions to avoid political issues and remain
neutral).
159. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2803, 2806, 2810
(2005).
160. See Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2817, 2822-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 2810.
162. See id. at 2803, 2806, 2810.
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and the states' efforts to address it.163 This was because the question of
whether Ms. Gonzales was entitled to protection against her batterer was
simply a matter of interpreting and applying a "neutral" legal concept. It
did not require any consideration of utility or benefit to Ms. Gonzales
and similarly situated women, or of the larger issues of domestic violence
and gender inequality. 164 The Court's decision to frame the issue as one
of property interests therefore results in a refusal to recognize domestic
violence as a serious issue that must be addressed.1 65 More fundamen-
tally, and perhaps even more disturbingly, this established practice of
framework characterization also reinforces the law's alleged detachment
and "objectivity," rather than its actual task to address the social and
"moral" issues of the day. 166 Moreover, the Court's power to determine
the "real issues" implies that it is the law, rather than an interpretation of
the facts and the law, which is responsible for any negative outcome. 167
B. Judicial Activism
The Supreme Court in Castle Rock not only framed and analyzed the
issue in a manner detrimental to women, but its decision has also been
characterized as "the functional equivalent of what [the Court] did to lib-
erty rights one hundred years ago in Lochner v. New York .... 168 In
Lochner,169 the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute limiting
the number of work hours in a baker's workday in order to protect the
workers' health 17° and shield them from employer exploitation.17 1 In di-
rect contravention to the statute's legislative history, the court "chose the
liberty of employers to exploit their workers over the health and safety of
the workers, contrary to the views of the legislature.'1 7  Similarly, in
Castle Rock:
163. Id. at 2810.
164. See id. at 2803, 2806, 2810.
165. Id. (stating that ending the analysis at this point minimizes the importance of
preventing domestic violence and protecting those whom the statutes are designed to
protect).
166. Mossman, supra note 137, at 158.
167. Id.
168. Christopher J. Roederer, Another Case in Lochner's Legacy, the Court's Assault
on New Property: The Right to the Mandatory Enforcement of a Restraining Order Is a
"Sham," "Nullity," and "Cruel Deception," 54 DRAKE L. REV. 321, 331 (2006).
169. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding a statute unconstitutional
which limited the hours in a baker's work day as an "unreasonable, unnecessary and arbi-
trary interference" with an individual's right to contract exceeding the police powers).
170. Id. at 58-59.
171. Id. at 62-63.
172. Roederer, supra note 168, at 362.
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[T]he Court has sided with local government, insulating it from
claims based on the arbitrary denial of the right of enforcement,
rather than helping a cognizable group of vulnerable residents whom
the state has made it mandatory for municipalities to protect. The
Court has elevated the liberty of police officers to ignore their duty
to enforce court-ordered restraining orders over the safety and se-
curity of the victims of domestic violence. 173
Indeed, the fact that the Court struck down a statute that explicitly
created a mandatory obligation for police officers to arrest alleged perpe-
trators whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that they have vio-
lated a protection order, seems to render all state-imposed mandatory
arrest statutes constitutionally unenforceable.' 74 If the Court intended to
revoke the power to create constitutionally enforceable mandatory arrest
statutes from the states, then law enforcement officials would be able to,
once again, decide for themselves when a situation merits the enforce-
ment of a protective order.1 75 Indeed, the leadership role of states in
legislating on domestic violence issues is not in dispute.176 State recogni-
tion of domestic violence as a critical problem and state enactment of
strong protective order legislation represent an important national
trend. 177 Courts have also acknowledged that the states have an impor-
tant role to play in preventing domestic violence, addressing its conse-
quences, and protecting victims. 178  Unfortunately, by narrowly and
selectively framing and analyzing the issues, the Court in Castle Rock suc-
ceeded in covering up the underlying issue of domestic violence. 179
173. Id.
174. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2803, 2806, 2822
(2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating that the Court's failure to enforce the statute
implies a high threshold for a showing of intent to create a mandatory arrest statute which
overrides police discretion).
175. Id. at 2803, 2817.
176. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that the issue of domestic relations "has been left to the States from time immemorial,
and not without good reason").
177. See Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2817 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reiterating that Colo-
rado was one of several states to have enacted such "mandatory arrest" statutes); Sack,
supra note 48 (discussing the nationwide movement of states that have established
mandatory arrest statutes to address the problem of domestic violence).
178. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing importance of states as laboratories of democracy).
179. Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806 (stating that use of "shall" to indicate mandatory
arrest was not strong enough to find liability).
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C. The Social Implications
The Court's decision is not only "un-objective" and perhaps even a
kind of judicial activism, but it also implicitly upholds male dominance in
at least three more ways. First, the decision leaves battered women with
no adequate legal recourse, thereby implicitly sanctioning male power
over women. Second, it further suppresses the underlying issue of gender
inequality, thereby perpetuating problems such as "unconscious bias.",
180
Finally, it sends a strong message to batterers and the public that domes-
tic violence, and hence the expression of male dominance, will continue
to be tolerated.
1. No Adequate Legal Recourse
Even after decades of domestic violence reform prompted by battered
women's advocates, statistics indicate that the legal system's response to
domestic violence has remained largely ineffective: domestic violence is
still the single largest cause of injury to women in the United States; 181
approximately thirty percent of murdered women were victims of domes-
tic violence;' 82 statistics suggest that physical abuse occurs in at least one
out of four intimate relationships;' 83 domestic violence is still a significant
contributing factor to social problems such as alcoholism, drug abuse,
mental illness, suicide, and homelessness; 184 and, women in long-term
abusive relationships have resorted to self-help methods to escape
abuse.1 85
Civil protective orders have remained one of the most widely available
and commonly used methods of legal recourse for victims of domestic
violence.186 In fact, protective orders have been characterized as "the
180. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1169 (1995).
181. Epstein, supra note 44, at 3.
182. Id. (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES V (1998),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vi.pdf).
183. Id. at 10.
184. Id. at 3-4 (citing Rita Thaemert, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE LEGISLATURES,
'TIL VIOLENCE Do Us PART 26 (1993)).
185. See generally Michelle J. Nolder, The Domestic Violence Dilemma: Private Action
in Ancient Rome and America, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1119 (2001) (discussing similarities be-
tween abused Ancient Roman and Modern American women and their attempts to escape
domestic violence).
186. Brief of National Coalition Against Domestic Violence & National Center for
Victims of Crime as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 10, Town of Castle Rock,
Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 2005) (No. 04-278).
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front line in the war against the abuse of women."'18 7 Because of the lack
of enforcement of protective orders, however, numerous states, including
Colorado, enacted mandatory arrest statutes, which generally require the
police to enforce a protective order whenever there is probable cause to
believe that the restrained person has violated or attempted to violate
any provision of the order.188 These mandatory arrest statutes were
therefore the latest effort to curb domestic violence. But despite signs of
progress, Castle Rock halted the effort and left women once again with-
out adequate legal recourse. As a result of Castle Rock, a protective or-
der remains "just a piece of paper"'8 9 and perpetrators of domestic
violence know that they can "act with ... the virtually total assurance
that, as statistics confirm, their acts will be officially tolerated, they them-
selves will be officially invisible, and their victims will be officially si-
lenced." 190 By refusing to recognize Colorado's mandatory statute, the
Court effectively sanctions male dominance by leaving women like Ms.
Gonzales to the mercy of their perpetrators.191
2. Perpetuation of Unconscious Biases
By not recognizing that physical abuse is a way for men to exert superi-
ority over women, the Court further suppresses the underlying issue of
male dominance and fails to recognize related problems such as uncon-
scious bias. 92 According to the "cognitive bias" approach, in an attempt
to simplify the world, people rely on categories, "person prototypes[,J"
and "social schemas," which "function as implicit theories, biasing in pre-
dictable ways the perception, interpretation, encoding, retention, and re-
call of information about other people." 193  This approach regards
stereotyping as a pervasive phenomenon that is not qualitatively different
from "normal" cognitive processes by which all people, not only
prejudiced people, make everyday decisions, and it emphasizes that peo-
ple unconsciously make biased judgments based on deeply-ingrained ste-
reotypes.' 94 These judgments are difficult to prevent because they occur
prior to the time the biased thought or decision is made, and because the
187. Christopher Shu-Bin Woo, Familial Violence and the American Criminal Justice
System, 20 U. HAw. L. REV. 375, 392 & n.116 (1998).
188. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3)(a) (2002).
189. See, e.g., PTACEK, supra note 46, at 169 (arguing that gender discrimination has
been institutionalized into American laws because male legislatures enacted them).
190. MAcKINNON, supra note 133, at 234.
191. Id.
192. Krieger, supra note 180, at 1188.
193. Id. (indicating that some biases are cognitive instead of motivated by awareness
and a deliberated stance on an issue).
194. Id. (explaining how relying on schemas can affect the decisionmaker's judgment
even before they are faced with the problem).
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decision-makers are rarely aware of the bias that corrupts their
judgments. 95
In the context of domestic violence and protective order cases, allowing
the police wide discretion to arrest or otherwise prevent an alleged perpe-
trator from inflicting further harm presupposes that officers are aware of
the unconscious biases that may corrupt their judgment.' 96 Many male
officers fail to respond to protective order calls, for example, because
they are naturally more sympathetic to the male abuser. 197 Officers may
also refuse to enforce a protective order because they believe that the
victim provoked the attack and therefore deserved the abuse. 98 They
may also personally believe that public law enforcement officials should
play no role in helping to resolve the private aspects of family life.1 99
Such attitudes may prevent police officers from making an objective ar-
rest decision, leaving the victim unprotected 20 0 and the batterer unpun-
ished.2 °1 Mandatory arrest prevents police prejudice from influencing
arrest decisions, which is precisely what the Colorado legislature contem-
plated when it enacted the mandatory arrest statute.20 2
Furthermore, the concept of male battering as a private issue continues
to exert a "powerful ideological pull on .. .[the] consciousness [of the
public] and leads many to deny the pervasiveness and seriousness of do-
mestic violence as a [social and] political issue.- 20 3 The Court's failure to
acknowledge and address the underlying issue of gender inequality in do-
mestic violence cases adds to the misconceptions and stereotypes which
contribute to law enforcement's failure to enforce protective orders, and
to society's view of violence between intimates as less serious than vio-
lence between strangers.
3. Message of Tolerance
Mandatory arrest statutes are meant to communicate to society and to
law enforcement officials that domestic violence and the violation of pro-
195. Id. (suggesting that cognitive biases are likely unintended and unconsciously
processed).
196. See id.
197. Eppler, supra note 64.
198. Id.
199. Wanless, supra note 43, at 545 (discussing the face of police officer discretion in
calls regarding domestic violence).
200. Truss, supra note 61, at 1190.
201. Wanless, supra note 43, at 545 (discussing the implications of a policy not to ar-
rest as allowing the batterer to "get away with it" and the victim to go unprotected).
202. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2803 (2005).
203. CHAMALLAS, supra note 113, at 264 (citing Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of
Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 983 (1991)).
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tective orders are grievous crimes that must be treated accordingly.2" 4
The protective order Ms. Gonzales sought to have enforced represented
the promise that the police and other law enforcement officials would no
longer dismiss claims of domestic violence. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion to hold Colorado's mandatory statute constitutionally unenforceable
undermines these very objectives, sending a strong message to the bat-
terer: that his conduct is not only tolerated, but even socially and legally
acceptable.2 °5
Men ... [get] the message from police officers that women battering
is not a crime and that the sanctions of the criminal justice system-
sanctions which presumably exist to deter and punish those who
have the inclination to behave in antisocial ways-are routinely not
invoked by police officers and that therefore they have nothing to
fear if they beat the women with whom they are, or were,
involved.2 °6
[The abuser] is violent at home because he has a bully's "sure win-
ner" mentality. He beats his wife because ... he can get away with it,
as long as society does not intervene. In contrast, he doesn't beat his
boss or his male acquaintances, not because he is never angry at
them, but because the price of such behavior is too great.20 7
Similarly, the Court's refusal to recognize Colorado's efforts to address
problems with the enforcement of protection orders communicates to the
larger public that domestic violence is, once again, something to be reck-
oned with in the private realm (i.e., that it is not as serious as violence
between strangers and is not to be treated as such).20 8 In an interview
with the American Civil Liberties Union, Ms. Gonzales echoed these
very concerns:
I don't think [that the police] ever took this restraining order seri-
ously. And I don't think that they take domestic violence seriously. If
I had told them that a stranger had taken my daughters, and I gave
them the make of his vehicle and I told them where I believed he
had taken them-all of which was information I gave them about
204. See, e.g., Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or
Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1148 (1994).
205. Truss, supra note 61, at 1190-91.
206. Welch, supra note 204 (alterations in original) (quoting Eva Jefferson Paterson,
How the Legal System Responds to Battered Women, BAT=ERED WOMEN 79, 82-83 (Donna
M. Moore ed., 1979)).
207. Wanless, supra note 43, at 553 (alterations in original) (quoting Kathleen Waits,
The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging
the Solution, 60 WASH. L. Rav. 267, 304 (1985)).
208. Id.
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[my husband]-then I think the reaction would have been different.
But Simon was the girls' father, and the police saw this as a domestic
issue, which was clearly not a priority for them.2 °9
The effect of police inaction and the refusal to treat domestic abuse as
serious as violence between unrelated parties turns out to be an implicit
sanctioning of the violent expression of male power and dominance.
VI. STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY
The process of legal reform on issues of domestic violence is "a process
by which women's experiences with battering are translated into law. "210
But this process of feminist lawmaking presents many challenges.211
First, feminists must put together a legal theory or theories that are ex-
pansive and flexible enough to account for the diversity of women's ex-
periences.212 Indeed, feminist scholars have recognized a variety of
approaches to describing and addressing the domestic violence issue.21 3
They have also begun to speak to related issues of "race, ethnicity, class,
disability, and heterosexism. '2 14 These issues are important to address
because studies indicate that rates of non-lethal domestic violence are
highest among women in the following four groups: (1) women between
the ages of sixteen and twenty-four, (2) black women, (3) women in low-
income households, and (4) women living in urban areas.215 In order to
209. Interview by the American Civil Liberties Union with Ms. Jessica Gonzales, Cas-
tle Rock v. Gonzales: Making the Court's Protection Real (Mar. 17, 2005), http://www.aclu.
org/womensrights/gen/13212res20050317.html.
210. SCHNEIDER, supra note 77, at 101 ("In theory, feminist lawmaking on battering is
a process by which women's experiences with battering are translated into law. But this
oversimplified statement presents many problems .... ).
211. See generally id. ("I have argued that the task for feminist lawyers is both to
describe and allow for change: to describe a legal problem for women-describe it in detail
and in context-and translate it to sympathetic courts in such a way that it is not misheard
and at the same time does not remain static.").
212. Id. at 7-8 (2000) (discussing the importance of uniting diverse realities of wo-
men's experiences and yet remaining flexible to adapt to changes in the needs of these
women).
213. Id. at 262 n.7 (2000); KATHERINE T. BARLETT- & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER
AND LAW (2d ed. 1998) (identifying six different feminist theoretical frameworks: formal
equality, substantive equality, non-subordination, women's different voice(s), autonomy,
and non-essentialism); MARY BECKER, CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, & MORRISON TOR-
REY, Feminist Jurisprudence: Taking Women Seriously (1994) (highlighting the following
feminist theories: feminist methodology, dominance theory, formal equality, hedonic femi-
nism, pragmatic feminism, socialist feminism, postmodern feminism, essentialism, and
heterosexism).
214. SCHNEIDER, supra note 77, at 103.
215. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, No. NCJ-167237, Vio-
LENCE BY INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES,
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truly understand and effectively tackle domestic violence issues, battered
women's advocates must pay attention and mold their approaches to
these diverse contexts in which abuse occurs.2 16
Second, feminists must translate their message in a way that is not mis-
interpreted. In the context of criminal cases involving battered women
who kill, for example, feminist claims for equal treatment are problematic
because they are often mistakenly viewed as a request for special treat-
ment.2 17 In trials involving women who killed their batterers, the female
defendant is often deprived of the right to a fair trial because of wide-
spread misconceptions and stereotypes about women who act violently
against their abusers. 218 Women who kill their batterers are often viewed
as crazy, "monstrous," or unreasonable, and are thus unlikely to success-
fully assert self-defense.219 In the 1993 case of Lorena Bobbitt, for exam-
ple, Ms. Bobbitt alleged that she had been emotionally, physically, and
sexually abused by her husband, and she testified that she injured him in
self-defense. 220 Instead of accepting her plea of self-defense, however,
the court acquitted her on the basis of temporary insanity and committed
her to a mental hospital.22' The case garnered sentiments of horror from
the public and solidified its conception of women who fight back against
their abusers as crazy and unreasonable.222 In light of gender bias issues,
feminists argue that courts should evaluate the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of each case.223 However, efforts to provide these women
with an equal right to trial are often mistaken as pleas for unjustified
special treatment. 22' As a result, such pleas are frowned upon as beyond
the traditional framework of the law.225 Similarly, Ms. Gonzales's plea to
have her protection order enforced may be misinterpreted as a request to
BOYFRIENDS, AND GIRLFRIENDS 11 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov.bjs/pub/
pdflvi.pdf.
216. SCHNEIDER, supra note 77, at 103 (describing the diverse constituency that femi-
nists must represent in order to fully address the issue of violence against women).
217. Id. at 115-16 (discussing the judicial system's confusion between equal treatment
and special treatment when a woman is accused of murder is "inherent in the problem of
equality, . . . [and] particularly endemic in claims of gender equality").
218. Id. at 113.
219. Id. at 114 (arguing that other defenses available to the women will be limited
based on the stereotypes of the jurors against "battered women").
220. Id. at 265 n.11 (2000).
221. SCHNEIDER, supra note 77, at 265 n.11 (citing Lorena Bobbitt Is Released, Or-
dered to Get Counseling ARIZONA REPUBLIC 1 (Mar. 1, 1994)) (noting that, interestingly,
Ms. Bobbitt was released from the mental hospital after only five weeks).
222. See id. at 114.
223. Id. at 115-16.
224. Id.
225. Id. (arguing that the result is that the gender bias problem is neither addressed
nor remedied, but exacerbated).
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226be given special treatment, instead of an effort to have her injuries
addressed through equal and effective enforcement of the laws designed
to curtail domestic violence. 2 7
Lastly, and most important, in order to successfully address the prob-
lem of domestic violence, courts must acknowledge the deeply-rooted un-
derlying social issue of gender inequality. Indeed, "[t]he identification of
[domestic] violence ... as gendered, as affecting women's freedom, citi-
zenship, and autonomy, and as fundamental to women's equality, revives
the core precept of the battered women's movement that generated the
past twenty-five years of important legal work on battering. 2 2 1 This con-
text, however, is lost in both public and legal dialogue; high government
officials have acknowledged that domestic violence is a problem affecting
the United States today, but fail to make the crucial link between vio-
lence and larger issues of male dominance and female subordination.229
Courts need to do their part to respond to domestic violence in a way that
not only acknowledges but also redresses domestic violence as a depriva-
tion of women's fundamental right to equality. Instead of masking the
existence of gender equality with "constitutional rhetoric" and claims of
"objectivity, ,231 courts should instead focus their analyses on whether the
law serves to perpetuate the subordination of women. As feminists have
argued, this approach confronts the issue of women's inferior status di-
rectly instead of using men's experiences and needs as the standard by
which the treatment of women should be held.
VII. CONCLUSION
The development of a battered women's movement has been one of
the most important contributions of the women's rights struggle:2 31 the
issue of domestic violence has been brought from invisibility to the fore-
front as an important public concern; 23 2 lawsuits and legislation have im-
226. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 77, at 116.
227. Id. (explaining that although self-defense is a legal justification for murder, this
defense rarely sways judges and jurors in a case where a women is battered by her spouse,
because the widely socially recognized application of self-defense was shaped by male
perspective).
228. Id. at 197.
229. Id. (arguing that government officials' concerns are empty because they simulta-
neously claim domestic violence is an important issue, while removing battered women
from welfare eligibility).
230. Town of Castle Rock, Colo v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (listing the criteria
for enforcement of the Colorado statute as "objective").
231. SCHNEIDER, supra note 77, at 197.
232. See MACKINNON, supra note 114, at 237; S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41-42 (1993)
(arguing that the needs of battered women to be protected are necessary); SCHNEIDER,
supra note 77, at 197 (implying that even if public officials discuss domestic violence with-
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proved police and court practices; 233 and mandatory arrest statutes at
least superficially acknowledge and address the hierarchical context in
which domestic violence occurs. 234 Nevertheless, Castle Rock illustrates
the legal system's ultimate refusal to recognize domestic violence as a
serious issue that both grows out of and reinforces a pervasive pattern of
male power and subservience within the family and society.235 Even Cas-
tle Rock Police Chief Tony Lane, who claimed that the officers were not
to blame for the tragic deaths of Ms. Gonzales's three children, acknowl-
edged that "[t]he tragedy of the Gonzales shootings points out the much
larger problem in this country ... with [protective] orders. They do not
protect society from the Simon Gonzaleses of the world. '2 36 Until the
courts take a step back from their "objective" and "gender-neutral"
frameworks to acknowledge the link between domestic violence and gen-
der subordination, the promise of equality will remain a far-off goal for
women's rights advocates and for the Ms. Gonzaleses of this country.
out a full understanding of its implications, they are still bringing the issue to the front of
public concern).
233. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41-42 (1993); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-6-
803.5(3)(a) (2002); Sorichetti v. City of N.Y., 482 N.E.2d 70, 72-73 (N.Y. 1985) (holding
the City of New York liable for failing to uphold the special relationship and duty of care
owed to a woman to prevent abuse); Bruno v. Codd, 393 N.E.2d 976 977 (N.Y. 1979)
(addressing the need for the police, legislators, and courts to protect women from the bru-
tality of their husbands). But see Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. 2796.
234. See Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing to state
legislation designed to protect the rights of battered women).
235. See Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. 2796.
236. Gonzales vs. Castle Rock, supra note 5.
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